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Historically there has been a poor correlation between stated government policy 
objectives in relation to land tenure reform in the Northern Territory and the measures 
devised in pursuit of them. Over the last decade, advocates of legislative reform of the 
ALRA and those seeking to demonise ‘communal title’ have tended to: 
 
• deliberately mischaracterise the efficacy of existing ALRA provisions; 
• ignore the intended beneficiaries, the Aboriginal land owners, in devising tenure 
‘solutions’; 
• overemphasise the likely outcomes of major legislative reform;  
and, more recently, 
• ignore the significant extent to which the formalisation of land tenure on 
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, by means of leasing, is now well 
advanced. 
 
As we move forward into the fourth decade of land rights in the Northern Territory, it is 
critical that governments focus on how to facilitate thriving and sustainable Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory and respond by devising effective policy and 
reforms based on the evidence.  
 
This paper looks back over the last seven years of land tenure reform with a view to 
capturing its impact and demonstrating that the underlying policies were ideological 
rather than evidence based. The last part of the paper looks forward and highlights that 
with land tenure formalisation within communities almost completed, there remains three 
major challenges to facilitating development on Aboriginal land in Aboriginal communities: 
regularising and expanding the delivery of infrastructure; ensuring that there is access to 
finance for economic development; and, in some communities, formalising negotiated 
settlements between residents and traditional owners.  
 
Looking back: ideology not evidence based land reform 
 
In 2006 the Australian Government embraced an emerging generalised critique of 
communal ownership. This critique characterised individual property rights as necessary 
for economic development, and communal title as inevitably inhibiting such development. 
This characterisation was relied on to justify amendments to the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) (ALRA). The amendments provided, among other 
things, for the leasing of whole remote Aboriginal townships to a government entity for 
ninety-nine years. Since 2006 the Australian Government has developed a range of further 
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land reform policies that are characterised as being directed towards promoting economic 
development and individual home ownership. 
 
The proponents of tenure reform need to consider the extent to which leasing has now 
been advanced using existing provisions of the ALRA that do not involve whole of township 
leases. This is particularly the case in the larger remote communities that are a primary 
focus for governments. The CLC has now processed 478 leases, including 23 forty year 
housing leases. In addition, the CLC has received 511 applications for leases and licences 
which will require consultations during 2013–2014. The large volume of leases executed 
over the past three years has not occurred due to major legislative change, nor as a result 
of new economic development opportunities, but because parties who previously did not 
seek leases are now applying for them. The CLC’s process for the grant of leases on ALRA 
title is efficient, clear and accessible to third parties seeking to formalise an interest in 
land. 
 
Two case studies are presented in this paper to demonstrate the full extent of the 
implementation of the ‘secure tenure’ policy in remote communities in the NT: Lajamanu 
and Alekarenge (Ali Curung).  
 
• A recent internal CLC audit of leases consented to at Lajamanu indicates that more 
than 81% of available serviced lots in the community are now leased, with further 
applications currently being processed which, if approved, would see this figure 
increase to 94%. 
 
• Similarly, 71% of all available serviced lots in Alekarenge are now leased, with 
further applications currently being processed which, if approved, would see this 
figure increase to 82%. 
 
Looking forward: development requires focus on the difficult issues 
 
Focusing solely on tenure and communal title as the key barrier to economic development 
and individual home ownership has distracted focus from the other critical factors 
requiring urgent attention. The most pressing and ubiquitous barriers to economic 
development and home ownership on remote communities in the Northern Territory 
continue to be neglected. These include major power, water and sewerage constraints and 
serious limitations on available serviced land. They also include the high cost of 
construction, the quality of infrastructure, low average incomes, the caution of mortgage 
lenders and a range of other market factors. These are the same barriers that exist in other 
primarily Aboriginal towns in the CLC region which are on ordinary Northern Territory 
freehold title, where the tenure system does offer private ownership. These include 
4 
 
Aputula (Finke) and Kalkarindji, where economic development and private home 
ownership are no further advanced than in communities situated on Aboriginal land. 
 
These case studies also highlight the urgent need for significant investment in essential 
service infrastructure and capital works to address the severe scarcity of vacant serviced 
land in remote communities across the CLC region.  
 
The remaining issues and challenges outlined include the need for improved investment in 
land administration systems and institutional infrastructure relating to land use; improved 
roads; substantial support for local enterprise; and Aboriginal land owners, lenders, Land 
Councils and governments working collaboratively to develop a range of commercial lease 
templates that will support Aboriginal people’s aspirations in economic development and 
private home ownership.  
 
A further issue outlined in the paper relates to the identified need in some communities to 
negotiate a settlement in relation to future land use that acknowledges the interests of 
long-term Aboriginal residents in addition to those of the traditional owners of that 
community.  
 
The collaborative effort of all interested parties, and in particular Aboriginal land owners 
themselves, is required to address these matters. Achieving this will require a commitment 
to evidence not ideology. 
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pursuit of them. 
Introduction 
 
Since 2004 there has been considerable debate around Indigenous communal land 
ownership at the national level.1 Policy proposals in response to this debate have ranged 
from minor amendments to land rights legislation aimed at better facilitating the grant of 
individual leasehold interests, to outright abolition of communal title in favour of 
individual titling.  
 
In 2006 the Howard government embraced an emerging generalised critique of communal 
ownership to move amendments to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (Cth) (ALRA). Those amendments provided, among other things, for the leasing of 
whole remote Aboriginal townships to a government entity for ninety-nine years.2 The 
amendments were characterised as heralding an end to the ‘days of the failed collective.’3 
Then minister for Indigenous Affairs Mal Brough said the changes would facilitate 
economic development and increase private home ownership. Since 2006 the Australian 
Government has developed a range of further land reform policies that are represented as 
being directed towards promoting the same objectives.4  
 
This paper considers the 2006 ALRA amendments and subsequent 
Australian Government policies in the context of the debate around 
communal title, economic development, home ownership and ‘security of 
tenure’. From the perspective of the Central Land Council (CLC), there has 
often been a poor correlation between stated policy objectives and 
measures devised in pursuit of them. It is often asserted that the 
proposed measures will better facilitate economic development or home 
ownership without sufficient articulation of precisely how, and without 
                                                 
1
 The debate was probably at its height between 2004 and 2007. There was considerably less public debate from 2008 to 
2012 but there has been a recent upsurge in disappointing commentary on this issue. See e.g. A Anderson, ‘New 
measure brings us home’ Northern Territory News (26 January 2013); N Rothwell, ‘The great unmentionables of remote 
life’, The Australian (6 February 2013); H and M Hughes, ‘With apologies, PM, home ownership is the key’, The Australian 
(15 February 2013). 
2
 The terms township and community are used interchangeably in this paper. Community is the term Aboriginal residents 
most commonly use, whereas township is the term used in the 2006 amendments and the debates surrounding them. 
3
 Second Reading Speech, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), House of 
Representatives, 31 May 2006, 4 (Brough). 
4
 See e.g. s 30A of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth), inserted into that legislation by 
the Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Reform and Reinstatement of Racial Discrimination Act) 
Act 2010 (Cth); Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 (Cth), s 33(b); Indigenous Economic Development 
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complementary initiatives to overcome non-tenure-related barriers. Significantly, 
technocratic land tenure ‘solutions’ are largely developed without the input of their 
would-be beneficiaries: the Aboriginal land owners.5  
 
Advocates of legislative reform have tended to 
mischaracterise the efficacy of existing ALRA provisions, 
overemphasise the likely outcomes of major legislative 
reform and, more recently, ignore the significant extent to 
which leasing of land in communities is now advanced. At 
the same time inadequate attention is paid to investing in 
addressing the most pressing and ubiquitous barriers to 
economic development and home ownership on remote 
communities in the Northern Territory. These include major 
power, water and sewerage constraints and serious 
limitations on available serviced land. They also include the high cost of construction, the 
quality of infrastructure, low average incomes, the caution of mortgage lenders and a 
range of other market factors. These are the same barriers that exist in other primarily 
Aboriginal towns in the CLC region which are on ordinary Northern Territory freehold title, 
where the tenure system does offer private ownership. These include Aputula (Finke) and 
Kalkarindji, where economic development and private home ownership are no further 
advanced. Evidence based policy should lead politicians and others to conclude that land 
tenure is not the primary inhibitor of economic development on Aboriginal land. 
 
Nonetheless, as the occupancy of ALRA land by both tiers of government and other parties 
is comprehensively formalised through voluntary leasing,6 some benefits are beginning to 
flow. Some of these benefits are tangible, for instance land owners receiving regular 
rents,7 and a clearer allocation of responsibility for certain assets. Some are less tangible 
                                                 
5
 In a submission to the Senate Standing Committee, Inquiry into the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Bill 2011 
and Two related Bills, Leon Terrill notes that ‘In 2008, the Australian Government released a two volume report called 
Making Land Work, in an attempt to better understand the complex issues affecting customary land reform in the 
Pacific. The report drew on the input of around 80 experts and practitioners in land reform and development… During 
the same period the Australian Government began its involvement in Aboriginal land reform in the Northern Territory. It 
did not commission a detailed report, nor call on the advice of experts. It did not establish a steering group, it did not 
even prepare or publish a land reform policy. It simply implemented a series of reforms as if the task were self-evident… 
The result has been an ad hoc, confused, expensive and at times contradictory approach to the implementation of land 
reform. On the whole, the outcome of these reforms has been very poor.’ It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
consider the policy rationale for recent reforms but this comparison is demonstrative. 
6
 In the CLC region leasing has proceeded under the existing mechanism provided for in section 19 of the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). Since the ALRA was passed in 1976 it has been possible for individual 
leasehold interests to be granted to third parties. For more information on the process for the grant of leases under 
section 19 of the ALRA see ‘Leasing Aboriginal Land’ on the Central Land Council website. 
7
 In the CLC region such rents are increasingly being used for community development projects. 
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title is not the 
main barrier to 
economic 
development. 
but nonetheless important, such as the recognition of traditional Aboriginal ownership 
through such transactions and of the need to seek permission of land 
owners. The latter is significant in the wake of the Northern Territory 
National Emergency Response (NTNER – or Intervention as it was 
widely known).8 The formalisation of land use on Aboriginal land in 
large communities9 is now advanced to the extent that certainty has 
been achieved by most third parties concerned about security of 
tenure.10 The process for the grant of leases on ALRA title is efficient, 
clear and accessible to third parties seeking or wishing to formalise 
an interest in land.  
 
The significant increase in voluntary leasing strongly indicates that communal title is not 
the main barrier to economic development and that the grant of formal interests alone is 
not a solution. This paper shows that while issues relating to land administration and 
leasing still require some work, the disproportionate focus on perceived problems with 
ALRA title distracts attention from other critical issues.  
Communal land ownership, individual title and economic 
development 
 
Hernan de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital was central to much local and 
international debate around land reform.11 In it de Soto argues that in 
order to unlock the full potential of land as an asset for wealth creation, 
formal legal title is essential. De Soto highlights the importance of 
efficient institutional arrangements which ensure land ownership is 
adequately recorded and certain so as to minimise transaction costs in 
land dealings. Such institutional arrangements, de Soto argues, allow the 
‘parallel life of assets’ to be unlocked for wealth generation. This is how 
prosperity was secured in the West, he argues, and a similar path is 
                                                 
8
 See, however, the discussion below on the need to consider mechanisms for negotiated settlement between long-term 
Aboriginal residents of remote communities and non-resident traditional owners. 
9
 Large communities are considered to be those with a population of more than 150. 
10
 CLC data suggests that around 90% of all available serviced land in some larger communities (as defined above) is now 
either under lease or under application and being processed. 
11




essential to the economic development and advancement of developing and post-
communist countries. De Soto focuses on urban fringe contexts where populations are 
dense and commercial activity is high despite a lack of formal title to land: 
 
Walk down most roads in the Middle East, the former Soviet Union, or Latin 
America, and you will see many things…parcels of land being tilled, sowed, and 
harvested…merchandise being bought and sold.  
 
Assets in developing and former communist countries primarily serve these 
immediate physical purposes. In the West, however, the same assets…can be 
used to put in motion more production by securing the interests of other parties 
as ‘collateral’ for a mortgage...Why can't buildings and land elsewhere in the 
world also lead this parallel life?
 12  
 
De Soto argues that, elsewhere, people hold land resources in ‘defective forms’. For 
example, houses are built on land for which ownership is not clearly recorded. De Soto 
argues that in the absence of clarity on ownership, such assets ‘cannot readily be turned 
into capital…cannot be used as collateral for a loan.’13  
 
Although the context differs dramatically from that of remote Aboriginal communities in 
the Northern Territory, there are aspects of de Soto’s thesis on the potential benefits of 
formalisation that warrant examination.14 Yet, in Australia, his ideas were drawn on to 
critique communally held Aboriginal land and its imputed role as the major impediment to 
economic development.15 Hughes and Warin, for example, inaccurately cite de Soto’s work 
in support of their assertion that communal ownership ‘impedes the productive use of 
land, employment creation and economic development worldwide.’ 16 In so 
mischaracterising de Soto’s writing, such commentators failed to note the primary feature 
                                                 
12
 Ibid, 36–7. 
13
 Ibid, 6. 
14
 ALRA land has been leveraged to make use of what de Soto refers to as the ‘parallel life of assets’: The example of Alice 
Springs to Darwin railway project leases illustrates how a commercial lease can be developed under ALRA which can by 
itself, or through sub-leases, be used as security to finance the overall commercial enterprise. The head lease between 
the Land Trust and the Austral Railway Corporation allows for transfer of the interest to a mortgagee and provides that 
the lessor may mortgage any sub-lease granted under the head lease without any further requirement of consent. 
15
 See e.g. H Hughes and J Warin, ‘A New Deal for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Remote Communities’ (2005) 
Centre for Independent Studies; Christopher Pearson, ‘Case to put lands right’, Weekend Australian, 11 December 2004. 
Commentators such as Gary Johns and Sarah Hudson have also contributed to this generalised critique of communally 
held title. Vanstone, Brough, Howard, Tollner and Elferink drew on such commentary in the critiques they adopted. 
16
 H Hughes and J Warin, ‘A New Deal for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in Remote Communities’ (2005) Centre 
for Independent Studies, 4. 
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of his thesis is not the need for individualised title in place of communal title; rather, his 
primary assertion is the need for a formalised land administration system.17 
 
Tom Calma observed that the critique of communal title in Australia largely took place 
without reference to specific locations or land administration regimes, which vary 
considerably by State and Territory: 
 
Much of the debate talked about Indigenous land with little regard for whether or not the 
land in question was native title land, land rights land, purchased land or simply whether 
the land in question was reserved for the benefit of indigenous peoples.18  
 
Critics assumed that ‘individual property rights necessarily lead to economic development 
which communal titles inevitably inhibit’ (emphasis in original).19 There was a failure to 
adequately interrogate to what extent – under a specific Aboriginal land regime – 
communal title is the main cause of a lack of economic development in remote Aboriginal 
communities.20 This is exemplified in the following assertion, again from Hughes and 
Warin, that ‘[c]ommunal ownership of land, royalties and other resources is the principal 
cause of the lack of economic development in remote areas.’21 The Howard government 
rather uncritically adopted such a characterisation in the lead up to the 2006 amendments 
to the ALRA.  
The impact of land tenure reform in the Northern Territory 
 
Since the end of 2004 the Australian Government has participated in the debate around 
communal title and has devised a range of ‘land reform’ policies, ostensibly in response to 
                                                 
17
 For example, Tehan observes that ‘de Soto’s work is largely with people who have no title or informal titles rather than 
access to a communal title’: M Tehan in L Godden and M Tehan (Eds), Comparative Perspectives on Communal Lands and 
Individual Ownership: Sustainable Futures (Routledge, 2010) 363. 
18
 T Calma, Ibid, 49. 
19
 M Tehan, Ibid, 366. At the same time as this debate began to gather momentum in Australia, the approach of 
international organisations like the World Bank had begun to change. While still advocating strongly for formal, secure 
and fungible interests in land, a 2003 report for the World Bank concluded that ‘[w]hether it is more appropriate to give 
property rights to individuals or to a group will depend largely on the nature of the resource and on existing social 
arrangements.’ In their submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006, Godden and Tehan note that the change of approach occurred because 
‘the move towards individual title and a market based land systems has not produced the outcome of land markets as an 
instrument for addressing poverty.’ 
20
 Noel Pearson took a more nuanced approach, rejecting the characterisation of the problem as one of communal 
versus individual ownership, arguing that ‘what is needed is an intelligent compromise, informed by an awareness that 
cultural preservation and integration into the mainstream economy are not immutably opposing forces.’ See N Pearson 
and L Kostakidos-Lianos ‘Building Indigenous Capital: Removing obstacles to participation in the real economy’ (2004) 
Easter Australian Prospect 1–10, 1. 
21
 H Hughes and J Warin, above n 14, 15.  
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this debate. 22 Then minister for Indigenous Affairs Amanda Vanstone, and Mal Brough 
after her, relied on criticism of communal title to justify amendments to the ALRA which 
passed in 2006.23  
 
2006 amendments  
 
Introducing the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (the Bill), 
then minister for Indigenous Affairs Mal Brough asserted that it would: 
 
provide more choices in life for Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory… [by providing] 
for a new tenure system for townships on Aboriginal land that will allow individuals to 
have property rights. It is individual property rights that drive economic development. The 
days of the failed collective are over.24  
 
Minister Brough noted that ‘many of the proposed amendments come from a joint 
submission by the Northern Territory government and land councils.’25 Those 
amendments that the NT Government and the Land Councils had jointly proposed were 
directed toward addressing technical aspects of the ALRA that had been acknowledged as 
increasing transaction costs and impeding, to some extent, the fungibility of ALRA land. 26  
 
Under the jointly agreed amendments, leasing for up to 40 years would be permissible 
without federal Ministerial consent (previously this was 10 or 21 years depending on the 
purpose). Further, Ministerial consent would only be required where $1m or more was to 
be paid or received on behalf of a Land Trust (previously such consent was required for 
transactions in excess of $100,000). Another jointly proposed amendment clarified that, in 
order for leased land to be used as a security, land-owner consent could be provided 
                                                 
22
 Including through its Indigenous advisory body, the National Indigenous Council, appointed after the abolition of 
ATSIC. See in particular the early contributions of Warren Mundine, e.g. ‘Indigenous groups debate role of land 
ownership’ (6 December 2004) http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2004/s1259072.htm accessed 11 June 2013. 
23
 It should be noted, however, that though framed in response to the communal title debate, many of the 2006 
amendments go back to earlier discussions emerging out of the John Reeves QC report, Building on Land Rights for the 
Next Generation. Report of the Review of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (1998); House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs response to Reeves’ report; and an 
earlier Options Paper by Phillip Ruddock as minister for Indigenous Affairs, Reform of the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 that was critical of the role of the Land Councils and points to the failure of the ALRA to 
deliver economic development and, in particular, better facilitate mining. However, leasing and recommendations for 
tenure reform did not feature prominently in Reeves’ recommendations. Reeves appeared to be more focused on 
addressing the development interests of non-Aboriginal people on Aboriginal land. 
24
 Second Reading Speech, Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth), House of 
Representatives, 31 May 2006 (Brough), 3–4. 
25
 Ibid, 4. 
26
 See NTG, ALC, NLC, CLC, TLC, Detailed Joint Submission to the Commonwealth – Workability Reforms of the Aboriginal 














upfront for the transfer of the leasehold interest by a mortgagee. The existing drafting of 
the relevant provision was considered by some to restrict a mortgagee’s ability to enforce 
their mortgage over an ALRA lease.27 The jointly proposed amendments were directed 
towards ensuring the existing ALRA regime facilitated: 
 
long term leasing, security transactions and the use of equity capital to promote both 
home ownership and businesses…without undermining the role of traditional owners in 
the enjoyment and management of their traditional lands or effecting a transfer of 
institutional and power relationships at play in those lands.28  
 
From the CLC’s perspective, a sensible approach would have been for the Australian 
Government to monitor the extent to which these jointly 
proposed amendments achieved their purpose of making the 
ALRA more ‘workable’ before introducing more radical land 
reform initiatives. As it happened, the amendments were 
introduced alongside the whole of township leasing provisions, 
which did not come from this joint submission, had not been 
subject to consultation with the Land Councils,29 were light on 
detail (which was largely left to regulations) and were premised 
on the alleged failure of the existing ALRA leasing provisions.  
 
Whole of township leasing 
 
The 2006 amendments introduced section 19A into the ALRA, which provided that a Land 
Trust may lease an entire ‘township’ to an NT or Australian entity. Though a voluntary 
option, the CLC and the NLC were concerned by apparent pressure applied in negotiations 
with the Tiwi Islanders and others to sign up to the township model in exchange for 
delivery of basic services.30  
 
                                                 
27
 That is, transfer would be possible ‘subject to the terms and conditions on which the initial grant of the estate or 
interest was made.’ Commentators included Neville Jones, then director of the NT Government’s Office of Aboriginal 
Development, who highlighted what he considered a problem with s 19(8) for prospective financiers in his paper 
Commercial Use of Aboriginal Land in the Territory (1998), Office of Aboriginal Development (Unpublished). The paper 
incorporated concerns expressed by the Australian Bankers Association. A version of this paper formed the basis of 
chapters 17 and 18 of the Northern Territory Government submission to the Reeves review. 
28
 M Tehan in Godden and Tehan (Eds), above n 15, 367. 
29
 See CLC evidence to Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (21 July 2006) transcript of evidence, 24. 
30
 ABC News Online. Brough ‘bullying’ Wadeye into signing 99-year lease. Available at: 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-11-17/brough-bullying-wadeye-into-signing-99-year-lease/1312246 accessed 11 June 
2013; evidence of the NLC to Senate Committee re Elcho Island, transcript p 17. 
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The expectation that 
traditional owners 
would forgo their right 
to engage in commercial 
development over large 
areas of vacant land for 
ninety-nine years in 
return for a rental 
determined by valuation 
rather than negotiation 
was unreasonable. 
While inalienability of title would be legally preserved under the 
new township leasing provision, the Land Councils considered 
that the practical effect of such an agreement was to negate 
some of the primary benefits of land ownership, including rights 
that a lessor would ordinarily retain. Maureen Tehan described 
entering into a whole of township lease as effectively resulting 
in the ‘[passage] of control of the land from traditional owners 
to the entity which will control all land dealings within the 
township for [99 years] and will be empowered to sublease 
portions of the land.’31 
 
The amendments prohibited inclusion of any provision in the lease requiring the consent 
of traditional owners to the grant of a sub-lease by the ‘entity’. This meant that traditional 
owners would have no final say over the grant of sub-leases in townships and no ability to 
prevent sub-leases to enterprises or business people that they might consider unwelcome. 
In relation to this issue, Sean Brennan noted that:32 
 
There is understandable concern amongst Aboriginal people and organisations about what 
kind of unwanted commercial activity might be [allowed] by sublease in the next 99 years, 
by a government entity about which people know nothing. In the absence of a negotiation 
process over the proposed amendments, these substantive issues were left largely 
unaddressed. 
 
Both the CLC and the NLC were critical of the township leasing provisions, arguing that:33 
 
• They are unnecessary. The outcomes sought can be achieved through leases under 
section 19. 
• They restrict the freedom of traditional owners to bargain commercially, through 
legislative restrictions on what may be provided for in the head lease.34 
                                                 
31
 M Tehan in Godden and Tehan (Eds), above n 14, 367. For a more comprehensive consideration of the nature of the 
section 19A provisions see L Terrill, ‘Days of the Failed Collective: Communal Ownership, Individual Ownership and 
Township Leasing in Aboriginal Communities in the Northern Territory’ (2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal, 814. For the 
operation of whole of township leases in practice see L Terrill, ‘5 years on: Confusion, illusion and township leasing on 
Aboriginal Land’, (2011) 1 Property Law Review 160. 
32
 S Brennan, ‘Economic Development and Land Council Power: Modernising the Land Rights Act or Same Old Same Old?’ 
(2006) 10(4) Indigenous Law Bulletin, 17–18.  
33
 Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs, Inquiry into Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment 
Bill 2006, respective CLC and NLC submissions.  
34
 As Brennan notes in his submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Community Affairs , Inquiry into Aboriginal 
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006, this constrains traditional owners’ ordinary bargaining position 





approach to land 
reform in the Northern 
Territory has been 
disappointingly 
simplistic and 
‘characterised by a 
tendency to jump 
directly from debate at 
a fairly ideological level 
to implementation of 
the reforms. 
• The expectation that traditional owners would forgo their right to engage in 
commercial development over large areas of vacant land for ninety-nine years in 
return for a rental determined by valuation rather than negotiation was 
unreasonable. 
• They promote private investment in housing and entrepreneurship by community 
residents while denying such investment and entrepreneurship to non-resident 
traditional owners.35 
 
Tehan observed that in the development and discussion 
of the township leasing amendments ‘little serious 
argument was made to support the assumptions 
underlying the changes – that [they] will inevitably 
produce economic, social and political development as 
an antidote to the social and economic alienation of 
Indigenous peoples within Australia.’36 Moreover, 
despite free market rhetoric having been used to 
promote the township leasing model, it has been argued 
that in practice the effect of the model ‘is to introduce a 
higher level of government control over private decision 
making.’37 
 
Terrill considers that, commencing with the whole of township amendments, the 
Australian Government’s approach to land reform in the Northern Territory has been 
disappointingly simplistic and ‘characterised by a tendency to jump directly from debate at 
a fairly ideological level to implementation of the reforms.’38 The Australian Government 
missed the important step of clarifying the aims of its reform and has not necessarily 
devised policy in a way that directly responds to the debate:  
 
                                                 
35
 Though the township leasing scheme appeared, on the face of the legislation, to marginalise traditional owners, Terrill 
notes that in practice the Wurrumiyanga/Nguiu township lease ‘has been promoted, and apparently also been received, 
as a vehicle for giving traditional owners greater input into land-use decisions. This is because, previously, [informal] 
decision-making about land use tended to occur at the community level, and at times traditional owners have been 
excluded from that process. The Wurrumiyanga township lease has increased the authority of traditional owners. This 
sits awkwardly with earlier arguments by the Australian Government that township leasing would allow non-traditional 
owner residents to escape the “feudal” control of traditional owners.’ L Terrill, ‘5 years on: Confusion, illusion and 
township leasing on Aboriginal Land’(2011) 1 Property Law Review 160, 173.  
36
 M Tehan in Godden and Tehan (Eds), Comparative perspectives on communal lands and individual ownership: 
sustainable futures, 355. 
37
 L Terrill, ‘Days of the Failed Collective: Communal Ownership, Individual Ownership and Township Leasing in Aboriginal 
Communities in the Northern Territory’, (2009) 32(3) UNSW Law Journal, 814, 816.  
38
 L Terrill, Indigenous land reform: what is the real aim of reforms? Presentation by the author at the 2010 National 




acquisition of five 
year leases damaged 
relations between the 
Australian 
Government and 
Aboriginal people in 
remote communities 
in the Northern 
Territory. 
While the public debate in Australia has been dominated by references to economic 
development and home ownership, government practice has instead focussed on 
implementing a new decision making structure.39  
 
Such a practice was evident in the next iteration of land reform policy in the Northern 
Territory: the compulsory acquisition of five year leases under the NTNER. 
 
Compulsory five year leases 
 
Under the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth), the Australian 
Government compulsorily acquired five year ‘leases’ over sixty-four 
communities across the Northern Territory. Thirty-one of these are 
in the Central Land Council region and twenty are on ALRA land.40 
Minister Brough described the acquisition of the leases as ‘crucial 
to removing barriers so that living conditions can be changed for 
the better in these communities in the shortest possible time 
frame.’41  
 
The leases would ‘give the government the unconditional access to 
land and assets required to facilitate the early repair of buildings 
and infrastructure.’42 The provisions went further than this, giving the Australian 
Government control over entire communities. No leases were negotiated. There were no 
rights noted in favour of residents or traditional owners except to the extent that interests 
were conferred under an earlier lease.43 The leases gave the Australian Government rights 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, 9.  
40
 Of the remaining eleven, one is on ‘vacant crown land’ under a land claim and the other ten are on Community Living 
Area (CLA) title, a form of NT Freehold excised from pastoral leases and held by an Aboriginal association or corporation. 
Though beyond the scope of this paper, the NT legislation that regulates the use of CLA title is far more restrictive than 
the ALRA regime and the CLC’s efforts over the past decade to convince the Northern Territory Government to amend 
these laws have been unsuccessful. The Northern Territory could address these barriers to leasing which do not exist 
under the ALRA at any time but due to their inaction the Commonwealth Government is currently considering using 
regulation-making powers under the Stronger Futures in the Northern Territory Act 2012 to amend these laws. For 
further information see the CLC submission to the Community Living Area Land Reform Discussion paper.  
41
 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Parliamentary Debates, 7 August 2007 (Second Reading 
Speech, 13 (Brough). 
42
 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives Parliamentary Debates, 7 August 2007 (Second Reading 
Speech), 8 (Brough). 
43
 Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (Cth), s 31. There were initial concerns that traditional 
Aboriginal owners and residents might be able to be evicted from their communities. However, in Wurridjal, the 
statutory entitlement under section 71 of the ALRA for Aboriginals to enter Aboriginal land and use or occupy it in 
accordance with Aboriginal tradition was held to be an existing ‘interest in land’ that was preserved. Wurridjal v The 
Commonwealth (2009) 83 ALJR 399 [109]–[112] per French CJ, [151]–[157], [160]–[162] per Gummow and Hayne JJ, 
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year leases stalled 






to exclusive possession, to repair, demolish or replace any existing buildings and 
infrastructure, and to unilaterally terminate the lease at any time.  
 
Dalrymple suggests that Howard and Brough were more interested in social and political 
control of communities and their residents. Brough was on the record as ‘indicating his 
desire to use the five-year compulsory lease period as an opportunity to persuade the 
traditional owners of as many [communities] as possible to consent to the granting of 
ninety-nine year section 19A ‘headleases.’44  
  
Despite a change in government in 2007, compulsory five 
year leases were retained with only minor changes. 
Significantly, however, the new Labor Government agreed to 
begin negotiations for the payment of rent and 
compensation for this compulsory acquisition. Further, they 
committed to voluntary lease negotiations at the expiry of 
the five year leases.45  
 
The compulsory acquisition of five year leases damaged 
relations between the Australian Government and Aboriginal 
people in remote communities in the Northern Territory. It stalled the formalisation of 
tenure in communities and tainted the signification of leasing in communities placed 
under five year lease.46 Five year leases ended in August 2012 and protracted negotiations 
between the Central and Northern Land Councils and the Australian Government over 
valuation methodologies for the payment of fair rent and compensation are finally 
complete. Negotiations for voluntary leases under the pre-existing provisions of the ALRA, 






                                                 
44
 Dalrymple, ‘Coercive Reconciliation: Stabilise, Normalise, Exit Aboriginal Australia’ (2007) Arena, 214. 
45
 Despite this welcome commitment, the Australian Government’s preferred model for securing voluntary leases 
remained that of whole of township leases (see below). 
46
 The Australian Government’s own evaluation of the NT Emergency Response (at page 11) recognised the problems 
caused by the compulsory acquisition of five year leases:  
Compulsory five-year leases were not well explained to the affected people and ‘added to their distrust of the 
government’s intentions’… Compulsory leases may have slowed the introduction of longer term leases by 
adding an additional requirement for ministerial approval and creating tenure without the need to negotiate 
with owners; however, some longer term leases have been entered into. 
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The CLC supports 
the formalisation 
of land tenure on 
Aboriginal land. 
Secure Tenure  
 
It is largely unknown and unacknowledged that, until recently, governments routinely built 
infrastructure on Aboriginal land not only without a lease but 
sometimes without permission or consultation. It is therefore 
unsurprising that ownership of a building, defining who has an 
interest in it and the responsibility for its ongoing maintenance has 
often been unclear. Under the Strategic Indigenous Housing and 
Infrastructure Program (SIHIP), sixteen of the sixty-four 
communities then under compulsory five year lease were allocated 
funds for new housing (three in the CLC region – 
Hermannsburg/Ntaria, Lajamanu and Yuendumu). This time 
Australian Government policy required that before SIHIP funding 
would be released, some form of long-term lease be in place over 
community housing lots. This was effectively the first manifestation of a new ‘secure 
tenure’ policy.47  
 
In practice, the ‘secure tenure’ policy is a policy for formalisation of tenure arrangements. 
The Australian Government wants to see every building in an Aboriginal community 
covered by a lease so that it is clear who is responsible for that building. To this end the 
government now insists that any entity that it is proposing to fund, and all government 
occupiers, seek leases over their assets, or over land on which assets are to be built. An 
important aspect of this requirement is that service providers make adequate provision for 
the costs associated with leasing and maintenance. This is also 
now a policy of the NT Government. The Central Land Council 
supports the policy to the extent that it is concerned with 
formalising occupancy and clarifying the responsibilities of third 
parties, and the payment of rent to land owners.48  
 
                                                 
47
 L Terrill, ‘Indigenous Land Reform: An economic or bureaucratic reform?’ (2010) 7(17) Indigenous Law Bulletin, 5. 
48
 In the context of housing precinct leases, the CLC has been concerned by the transfer of housing from community 
housing organisations to Territory Housing that occurred under compulsory five year leases. In negotiating subsequent 
voluntary leases the CLC negotiated to prevent complete institutionalisation of government ownership and responsibility 
for housing through leases to the Executive Director of Township Leasing (EDTL – a Commonwealth statutory entity) 
rather than directly to Territory Housing. In all cases Territory Housing has been granted a shorter-term sub-lease and 
the EDTL can grant subsequent sub-leases to ‘any appropriate body.’ The agreed lease provides oversight through 
performance reviews of any sub-lessee (including Territory Housing). It is hoped that, following the dissolution of 
Indigenous Community Housing Organisations, this will provide Indigenous organisations with the time and opportunity 
to develop sustainable models in order to re-enter the housing sphere as housing managers following the first sub-lease 




tenure can only 
be the solution 




tenure’ was in 
fact the key 
causal problem. 
It has been widely acknowledged that the informal arrangements that had previously 
prevailed in communities gave rise to some significant issues including:49 
 
• That traditional owners of the land didn’t receive rent or an opportunity to set the 
terms of the occupancy. 
• The absence of clear arrangements between traditional owners and non-traditional 
owner residents of a community. 
• Land couldn’t be legally treated as an asset and so couldn’t be used to raise equity 
through mortgage or sale. 
• That occupiers were perhaps uncertain about their rights (which may have affected 
their willingness to invest in infrastructure). 
• Confusion about how responsibilities were shared between occupant, local 
government and service providers (e.g. who was responsible for maintenance). 
 
However, the characterisation of Australian Government 
policy as being directed towards ‘secure tenure’ rather than 
tenure formalisation tends to convey the notion that prior to 
the NTNER there was insecurity of tenure on Aboriginal land. 
While it is unorthodox for assets to be built without the asset 
owner having either a lease or other interest in land, this was 
previously widespread in the Northern Territory. If there had 
been actual, as opposed to theoretical, risks to organisations, 
who built, occupied and maintained buildings in Aboriginal 
communities, it is surprising that government agencies and 
organisations did not systematically apply for leases in the decades before 2007. 
 
Further, while supportive of the formalisation of occupation and land use on Aboriginal 
land, the CLC considers it problematic that governments sometimes characterise ‘secure 
tenure’ as somehow representing a solution to the problems of Aboriginal communities. 
Security of tenure can only be the solution to problems in Aboriginal communities if 
‘insecurity of tenure’ was in fact the key causal problem. There is no evidence to suggest 
that this was – or is – the case. It is also not clear how formalisation of existing 
                                                 
49
 L Terrill, above n 35, 820–1. 
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forty year housing 






government and commercial occupation and leasing of lots for future construction will 
itself lead to widespread economic development or home ownership.50  
 
The Australian Government’s preferred approach to tenure formalisation continues to be 
through whole of township leasing to the Executive Director of Township Leasing (EDTL) – 
the Australian Government entity set up following the township leasing amendments. The 
Australian Government approached the three communities in the Central Land Council 
region that were allocated new housing funds under the SIHIP to consider whole of 
township leasing. All three rejected this option and agreed to enter into a lease over 
housing only; they have since considered further leasing applications on a case by case 
basis. Leasing in communities in the CLC region is now proceeding on an unprecedented 
scale under the pre-existing provisions of the ALRA (section 19).  
‘Secure tenure’ – significantly advanced  
 
Now that five year leases have ended, the ‘secure tenure’ policy is in 
practical effect. The CLC is dealing with an enormous workload 
processing leasing applications that governments departments, 
service providers and other parties (such as local store and art centre 
corporations) have submitted. Most such applications pertain to 
existing interests in the thirty communities that were previously 
under compulsory five year lease.51 The CLC has now processed 478 
leases, including 23 forty year housing leases. In addition, the CLC has 
received 511 applications for leases and licences which will require 
consultations during 2013–2014.  
  
The case studies of Lajamanu and Alekarenge in the boxes below highlight the extent to 
which the formalisation of tenure through leasing is now advanced. The large volume of 
leases executed over the past three years has not occurred due to major legislative 
change; rather, it is because parties who previously did not seek leases are now applying 
for them,52 third parties are gaining a better understanding of the existing mechanisms for 
                                                 
50
 In larger communities it will certainly provide some economic stimulus but whether this leads to widespread economic 
development will depend on further factors such as the extent to which infrastructure constraints are addressed and 
roads are improved (see Remaining Issues and challenges below). 
51
 At the time of writing traditional owners have consented to leases over around 1500 lots within communities on ALRA 
and CLA title. This number will increase significantly throughout 2013–2014.  
52
 This is because under the ‘secure tenure policy’ the Australian and NT governments have committed their 
departments to seeking leases and paying rent and have instructed their funding bodies to follow suit (see discussion of 
secure tenure above) . 
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seeking a lease under the ALRA,53 and governments aren’t providing funding to 
organisations to build infrastructure unless they have a lease. In addition the CLC now has 
better resources to assist in processing lease applications. The case studies also highlight 
the urgent need for significant investment in essential service infrastructure and capital 
works to address the severe scarcity of vacant serviced land in remote communities across 
the CLC region. Without such investment, any future land reform measures that are 
directed towards economic development or private home ownership will be fruitless. 
 
Case Study 1: Lajamanu ‘Priority Community’ and ‘Major Remote Town’ 
Lajamanu is a remote settlement 560 kilometres south-west of Katherine with a 
population of 656.54 Together with Hermannsburg and Yuendumu it is one of the three 
communities in the Central Land Council region that received new housing under the SIHIP 
program. The Australian Government has also designated Lajamanu as a ‘priority remote 
community’ under the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery.55 In 
addition, it is one of six communities in the CLC region that the Northern Territory 
Government has designated as a ‘Major Remote Town’, and as such is to be developed to 
‘provide services to all people living in that region, just like regional centres elsewhere in 
Australia.’56  
 
A recent internal CLC audit of leases consented to at Lajamanu indicates that more than 
81% of available serviced lots in the community are now leased.57 Further applications are 
currently being processed, which, if all were consented to, would see 94% of all available 
serviced lots in the community under lease.58 Prior to 2009, leases had been applied for 
and granted over only five lots (four of which had since expired).59 This means that leases 
over around 80% of available serviced lots, both with existing assets and vacant, have been 
agreed to and processed over the past four years under section 19 of the ALRA.  
 
                                                 
53
 Leases sought over housing and government infrastructure are generally for forty years, lease applications from non-
government entities range from two to twenty years.  
54
 According to the 2011 Census. 
55
 According to FaHCSIA an element of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery ‘is a commitment 
by governments to work with Indigenous communities to improve the delivery of services…to the standard provided to 
other Australians living in communities of similar size and location.’ See National Partnership Agreement on Remote 
Service Delivery. 
56
 These were known as Territory Growth Towns under the former Territory Labor government; for further explanation 
of this policy see the website of the NT Department for Regional Development.  
57
 Traditional owners have approved all of these in accordance with section 19 of the ALRA and they have been executed. 
This figure includes all lots within the community that have been allocated a lot number (whether vacant or with built 
infrastructure) and are serviced and reticulated.  
58
 Only around 14% of total lease applications are from parties other than the Australian, Northern Territory and local 
governments. Only about 6% are related to commercial enterprise, being for the store, art centre and storage and 
accommodation related to these businesses.  
59






Of the remaining serviced lots not under lease, all have existing built infrastructure.60 
Advice from the Department of Lands, Planning and Environment indicates that there is 
not a single lot of available vacant serviced land in the community. The current airstrip will 
eventually be moved north in order to provide for the possibility of future growth. 
Significant investment in head-works will be needed in order to have power, water and 
sewerage infrastructure in place for any future development on new subdivisions.  
 
At present the ‘secure tenure’ policy is almost fully implemented at Lajamanu without a 
whole of township lease having been entered into.61 Should any local Aboriginal person 
wish to open a business or build their own home, they would readily be able to apply for 
and negotiate a lease under section 19 of the ALRA. However, at present, that person 
would have to incur significant additional land servicing costs on top of asset construction 
so as to provide power, water and sewerage delivery to the lot. The average small business 
or home owner elsewhere in Australia does not incur such costs. The focus on Lajamanu as 
a priority community for government services and public housing investment, while 
                                                 
60
 This includes two churches and church residences which, if in existence since the community was a mission, have a 
statutory right to ongoing occupation under section 18 of the ALRA without a lease. Other built infrastructure, a mere 
nine lots, appears to be occupied by non-government parties who have not yet sought leases. 
61
 Reference is to a township lease to the EDTL under section 19A of the ALRA (See above). 
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absolutely welcomed, has strained existing infrastructure and serviced land availability.  
No investment has been made to date in improving the general availability of serviced 
land.62 Such investment is urgently needed and this is acknowledged as necessary in both 
the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Service Delivery and the Northern 
Territory Government ‘Major Remote Towns’ policy. These constraints represent the 
major barrier to economic development in a town that is at capacity in terms of available 
serviced land.63  
 
Similar issues are emerging at the ‘priority communities’/‘Major Remote Towns’ of 
Hermannsburg and Yuendumu, which each have almost no vacant serviced land to 
accommodate future growth. Both need major infrastructure upgrades to sewerage and 
water respectively. Despite the apparent priority status of these communities, the CLC has 
been advised that neither government has allocated any funding to address these major 
infrastructure constraints under their respective 2013–2014 budgets.64 
 
Case Study 2: Alekarenge – ‘Major Remote Town’ 
Alekarenge is a remote settlement 170 kilometres south of Tennant Creek, with a 
population of 535.65 It is not a ‘priority remote community’ for the Australian Government 
and did not receive new housing under SIHIP. The Northern Territory Government has, 
however, designated it as a ‘Major Remote Community’.  
 
A recent internal CLC audit indicates that 71% per cent of all available serviced lots in the 
community are now leased.66 Further applications are currently being processed, which, if 
all were approved, would see 82% of all available serviced lots in the community under 
                                                 
62
 Though it must be acknowledged that investment has been made in servicing land for new public housing on 
previously greenfield areas leased as part of the housing precinct lease. 
63
 The Department of Regional Development acknowledges on its website that ‘In order to have services like any other 
country town, remote towns will need proper infrastructure – including water, sewerage, electricity and community 
facilities.’ No funding or plan for the delivery of such infrastructure is identified in ‘Major Remote Towns’ brochures or 
fact sheets. For more information see http://www.drdia.nt.gov.au/regional_services/major_remote_towns. 
64
 According to correspondence from the Power and Water Corporation, neither the Northern Territory Government nor 
the Australian Government has allocated any funding for servicing land or infrastructure upgrades at any remote 
communities under its 2013–2014 Budget. A total of $2m Territory-wide is allocated specifically for Government 
Employee Housing related land servicing. The Power and Water Corporation determines its own capital investment 
program, and has an allocation of $217 million in the 2013–2014 budget; significant projects totalling $192.2 million of 
this allocation are listed. The CLC has been advised that officers of the Power and Water Corporation proposed a capital 
program of works including the needs identified above but funding has not been allocated. A further $32m across the 
Territory is budgeted for infrastructure grants comprising Indigenous essential services. See 
http://www.treasury.nt.gov.au/PMS/Publications/BudgetFinance/BudgetPapers/I-BP04-1314.pdf 
65
 According to the 2011 Census. 
66
 Traditional owners have approved all of these in accordance with section 19 of the ALRA and they have been executed.  
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lease.67 Prior to 2010, no leases had been applied for or granted at Alekarenge.68 This 
means that leases over more than 70% of available serviced lots, both with existing built 




Despite close to 9% of serviced lots being vacant, the Northern Territory Department of 
Lands, Planning and Environment has advised that sewerage is at absolute capacity. No 
further development is possible until this is fixed. The CLC understands that a major 
sewerage upgrade is scheduled to begin soon but will not be completed for two years. 
Should any local Aboriginal person, wish to open a business or build their own home they 
would readily be able to negotiate a lease under the ALRA; however, at present they 
would not be able to construct anything until the sewerage constraints are addressed.  
 
The CLC recently fielded an enquiry from someone who works close by to Alekarenge and 
was seeking a long-term lease to build a home in the community. The CLC recommended 
that he talk to the Department of Lands, Planning and Environment first and explained 
that a lease application could be made and processed under the ALRA should a suitable 
                                                 
67
 Only 4% of total lease applications are from parties other than the Australian, Northern Territory and local 
governments. These relate to a store, bakery and art centre and associated accommodation. 
68
 However, one special purpose lease that pre-existed that grant of Aboriginal land was in place. 
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vacant serviced lot be identified. Having been informed by the Department of the 
incapacity for any development due to the sewerage constraints and the timeframe for 
resolution of this issue, that person has chosen to pursue an option outside of the 
community.  
 
A similar issue is apparent at the only other Northern Territory Government ‘Major 
Remote Town’ on Aboriginal land in the CLC region not yet mentioned: Papunya.69 The 
Department of Lands, Planning and Environment has advised that the existing water 
infrastructure is at capacity and will cost approximately $1m to fix. Sewerage 
infrastructure is also reported to be fragile. Major expensive upgrades of water and 
sewerage infrastructure are urgently needed in order to accommodate any future growth.  
 
The Northern Territory Government’s ‘Major Remote Towns’ policy states that ‘[i]n order 
to have services like any other country town, remote towns will need proper infrastructure 
– including water, sewerage, electricity and community facilities.’ Neither the Northern 
Territory nor the Australian Government has made any funding available in 2013–2014 for 
such upgrades in order to address this major infrastructure constraint at Papunya.70  
 
Remaining issues and challenges 
Essential services infrastructure 
 
In addition to the major essential services infrastructure constraints outlined in the case 
studies above, the CLC understands that power and sewerage infrastructure as well as 
sustainable potable water sources at many other remote communities across the region 
are currently at or close to capacity and in need of upgrade. This is recognised in an 
independent review of the National Partnership Agreement on Remote Indigenous 
Housing (NPARIH) program, which notes that:71 
 
significant need remains for reliable infrastructure and essential services in many 
communities. The infrastructure gap will grow without further investment in capital works 
for asset replacement and upgrades...Already, in some locations, infrastructure in remote 
Indigenous communities is at capacity. 72 
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 CLC data indicates that 73% of all available serviced lots at Papunya are under lease and that further applications are 
currently being processed which, if approved, would see 89% of existing lots in the community under lease (any future 
development being contingent on infrastructure upgrades).  
70
 See above n 57. 
71
 National Partnership on Remote Indigenous Housing – Progress Review (2008–2013), 10. 
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funding to develop 




can’t grant leases over 
12 years to anyone but 
the Australian 
Government until 
cadastral surveys are 
completed. 
 
The CLC understands neither government has allocated any money 
in their 2013–2014 budgets to address these infrastructure 
constraints at any of the communities previously under five year 
lease. With the exception of the sewerage upgrade scheduled for 
Alekarenge, not even the ‘priority communities’ and ‘Major Remote 
Towns’ are being allocated funding to address these significant 
problems, which are an immediate and considerable barrier to 




A genuine commitment to formalising tenure and facilitating the grant of individual 
interests will require a range of further matters to be comprehensively addressed (and 
funded). These include what the World Bank refers to as the ‘institutional infrastructure’ 
necessary to underpin the recognition of formal leasehold interests: 
 
The establishment of secure property rights, that is, rights that are defined with sufficient 
precision and can be enforced at low cost so as to instil confidence in economic agents, 
requires considerable investment in both technical infrastructure, such as boundary 
demarcation and generation and maintenance of maps and land records, and social 
infrastructure, such as courts and conflict resolution mechanisms.73  
 
A relevant example of the current dearth of such institutional 
infrastructure for remote communities on Aboriginal land is the 
absence of whole of community cadastral surveys. The Planning 
Act (NT) treats any lease for twelve years or more as a 
subdivision, which in turn requires a survey in registrable form. 
Given the considerable expense involved in the surveying of 
individual lots, this has often led to the grant of leases of less 
than twelve years; to imprecise definition of boundaries; to delays in formalising interests; 
and to attempts to get around planning requirements.74 It has also led to many leases not 
being registered, which can be an impediment to the visibility and enforcement of 
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 K Deininger, Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction, World Bank Research Report (Oxford University Press, 
2003), 25. 
74
 Under section 19A whole of township leases the Minister has excluded the operation of NT planning laws and other 
regulations for the EDTL. Problematically, this means the EDTL enjoys an exemption in NT legislation that, arguably, 
works against the ‘establishment of secure property rights’. 
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leasehold interests and, as a consequence, to access to finance. Elsewhere in Australia 
governments provide such institutional infrastructure. Dalrymple highlighted this concern 
in 2007 and opined that ‘what should have happened many years ago was the one-off 
funding of such surveys for every community on ALRA land in the Territory.’75  
  
Only recently have governments recognised that carrying out whole of community surveys 
is an important issue in the context of tenure formalisation. The Australian and Northern 
Territory governments have recently provided funding to undertake whole of community 
cadastral surveys in all ‘Major Remote Towns’. The CLC understands that funding for 
surveys in all other communities previously under five year lease has now been made 
available. This investment is welcomed and will improve land administration within 
communities.76 The roll-out of community surveys on all Aboriginal communities will go 
some way to government finally performing what Dillon and Westbury refer to as ‘their 
primary task of putting in place the institutional framework necessary for the economic, 
social and cultural development of their citizens.’77 However, the characterisation of whole 
of community cadastral surveys by officers of the Northern Territory Government as the 
‘biggest shake up of land tenure since the Aboriginal Land Rights Act or 1976’ is probably a 
slight exaggeration.78 
 
Importantly the World Bank notes that the provision of such institutional infrastructure: 
 
provides a necessary, though by no means sufficient, condition for participation in a 
modern economy through mechanisms such as mortgaging and the associated 
development of financial markets.79 
 
Once cadastral boundaries of individual lots are adequately defined, an update of the 
Northern Territory Land Title system is needed to allow proper visibility of the registered 
interests granted over discrete lots (administrative lots) within communities. These two 
features, if coupled with significant investment in essential service infrastructure, 
improved roads and adequate support for local enterprise, would provide a much stronger 
foundation for economic development. However, it should not be assumed that land 
markets will automatically flow from such developments.  
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 D Dalrymple, above n 41, 216. 
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 ‘NT Laws Altered in Historic Tenure Move’, Northern Territory News (27 February 2013). 
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 M Dillon and N Westbury, Beyond Humbug: Transforming Government Engagement with Indigenous Australia 









stated that there 





land through the 
leasing provisions 
of section 19. 
Access to finance, home ownership and economic development 
 
In late 2011 the Northern Territory Government convened a forum in 
Darwin considering ‘Access to Finance on Aboriginal land’. It looked 
specifically at ALRA title and involved participants from all the major 
banks, from Land Councils, the Northern Territory and Australian 
governments and Indigenous Business Australia (IBA). At the forum, 
representatives of the major banks generally expressed the view that 
there were no major legislative impediments to providing finance on 
Aboriginal land through the leasing provisions of section 19. Bankers 
stated that they are used to dealing with diverse legislative and 
planning regimes with complex consent and approval processes (some 
far more complex than those under the ALRA).  
 
According to a Northern Territory Government account of the forum: 
 
A consensus emerged that appropriate land tenure arrangements, though important, are 
not a ‘golden ticket’ to resolving the barriers to private home and commercial property 
ownership on Aboriginal land. 
 
Bankers noted that issues such as remoteness, low demand, the high cost of construction 
and risk profile are significant. The representatives of the banks highlighted that there is a 
gap between the cost of building and what people can afford to repay (and therefore 
realistically borrow), whether for private home ownership or enterprise development. 
Financiers emphasised that it is not their role to bridge this gap and also expressed 
concern about the retention of value in built infrastructure in remote communities. Such 
matters are major barriers to commercial lending and combine with infrastructure 
constraints to make finance for home ownership under standard commercial 
arrangements problematic. In turn, these matters indicate that the scope for borrowing 
against a home in order to access finance to start a business may be limited.  
 
Bankers expressed a further concern about public relations should they ever need to 
enforce their rights of foreclosure under a mortgage. It was stated, frankly, that it would 
be a public relations nightmare for a bank to be on the news for evicting an elderly remote 
Aboriginal person from their first home due to default on a bank loan. These concerns 
mean that banks may be reluctant to lend on a traditional 'one on one' basis and would be 
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The CLC agrees 
that tenure plays a 
role in facilitating 
home ownership 
and recognises 
that access to 
finance will require 
transferable and 
marketable leases 
to be developed to 
meet a range of 
aims. 
more comfortable if there was, for example, government guarantees or other assurances 
provided. The CLC is not aware of any response by the Australian or Northern Territory 
Government to these suggestions.  
 
The CLC is concerned that, on initial evidence, resale prices are likely to be lower than the 
amount a remote Aboriginal person or family would need to lend from a bank. This factor 
is seriously problematic for prospective home owners, for the creation of a market for 
private home ownership in remote areas and it renders the quality of ‘parallel life’ such 
assets might enjoy questionable. For land assets to be leveraged as capital in the way de 
Soto speaks of, they need to be both subject to a formal land administration system and 
desirable to the market as property– not only to entice lessees or purchasers, but also to 
convince financial institutions that the land is valuable as collateral for a loan (i.e. that the 
interest may be sold for a good price if the loan is defaulted 
on). Even where a land market emerges, there are also 
potentially significant implications for the make-up of a 
remote Aboriginal community should a bank wish to 
foreclose on a mortgage and sell their interest in land to an 
outsider.80  
 
It is evident that all parties need to undertake more detailed 
work to address the range of barriers to economic 
development and home ownership that are particularly 
apparent in remote communities throughout the CLC region. 
The CLC agrees that tenure plays a role and that access to 
finance will require transferable and marketable leases to be developed to meet a range of 
aims. Some templates that permit transfer and assignment have been developed and 
utilised in the CLC region. However, the CLC would welcome the opportunity to work with 
lenders and governments to develop a range of commercial lease templates that all parties 
agree would support Aboriginal aspirations for economic development on Aboriginal land. 
Such work must, however, be accompanied by complementary initiatives. For example, in 
relation to business, governments could lead the way by identifying the infrastructure 
needs of aspiring entrepreneurs in Aboriginal communities and put in place a plan to assist 
in providing such infrastructure. This may require governments to build or subsidise the 
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 Issues around transferability of leases for home ownership and consideration of open and closed markets require 
further consideration that is beyond the scope of this paper. The CLC proposes to consider this and other issues in 
relation to access to finance and home ownership in a forthcoming paper. 
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building of retail spaces which could then be leased out cheaply to locals to enable them 
to set up a business.81  
 
Further, while there is some interest in home ownership in central Australia, under 
ordinary commercial arrangements it is seriously doubtful that it will be a feasible option 
for the majority of remote Aboriginal people at present, much less a solution to housing 
shortages.82 Altman et al, echoing some of the concerns the bankers raised, makes the 
observation that ‘unless income levels increase dramatically in remote Indigenous 
communities, a push to private ownership will not result in private financing of the 
construction of a significant number of new dwellings…primarily because the cost of 
constructing housing is far higher than the likely value of the land.’83 
 
There are a range of home ownership models on Indigenous lands that have been 
developed in New Zealand, Canada and the USA that might be considered and learnt from 
in the context of the Northern Territory.84 The CLC hopes to contribute further to proper 
consideration of these matters so that the issues highlighted above might be better 
understood and responded to based on careful analysis and evidence.85 
 
                                                 
81
 The Interim Review of IBA’s Approach to Developing Small Businesses in East Arnhem Land, for example, revealed a 
‘lack of infrastructure and availability of basic resources to support economic development and participation’ p 23. The 
provision of such retail spaces was mooted as a possible part of the former Northern Territory government’s plans to 
establish Government Business Centres in all ‘Major Remote Towns’ (then known as Territory Growth Towns) – none 
were built and the CLP Government does not appear to have pursued this. While the Northern Territory Government has 
an Indigenous Business Development program, the program’s $600,000 per annum Northern Territory wide budget is 
unlikely to enable infrastructure issues to be addressed. The Northern Territory ‘Draft Indigenous Economic 
Development Strategy 2013-2020’ includes supporting ‘pathways to business development’ which ought to encompass 
funding and subsidies for construction of retail spaces in remote communities. The Indigenous Business Australia 
‘Business Development and Assistance Program’ does not extend to the systematic subsidy or construction of service 
infrastructure or retail spaces in remote Aboriginal communities; however, IBA could usefully develop such a program. 
The Indigenous Capital Assistance Scheme eligibility criteria require that ‘Indigenous businesses must comply with the 
participating financial institution’s lending criteria’. 
82
 Costs to service land will be additional to high construction costs unless governments address the availability of 
serviced land. In the alternative, rent to buy schemes or outright purchase of social housing would require Territory 
Housing and the Australian Government to develop some kind of policy for the sale of remote housing stock and would 
also necessitate the variation of housing precinct leases to accommodate this option, as all community housing is now 
under a public housing model. The CLC considers that while purchase of existing housing is likely to be more feasible in 
remote communities, there is a danger that it will result in a decrease in available social housing unless there is a 
commitment to building further social housing where existing stock is sold.  
83
 J Altman et al, Land Rights and Development Reform in Remote Australia, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. 276 (2005), 14. 
84
 See e.g. Ibid, 24, P Memmot et al, Indigenous Home Ownership on Communal Title Lands, AHURI Positioning Paper No. 
112, 14–16; B Livesay, ‘Housing development on Māori land – Two case studies in developing and retaining Māori land’ 
(2012) Maori Law Review. 
85
 Those long-term leases issued to support private home ownership on the Tiwi Islands, with finance from Indigenous 
Business Australia, will provide an important case study in relation to many of the relevant considerations.  
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It is the CLC’s 
statutory duty (s 19) 







giving rise to 
ongoing disputes. 
A mechanism for negotiated settlement between residents and traditional owners 
 
Beyond the more obvious aspects of land administration and reform there is a further 
matter that the CLC considers a priority for future land policy relating to communities on 
Aboriginal land. Together with the demise of community government councils, the 
formalisation of tenure in remote Aboriginal communities has brought into sharper 
definition the need to develop mechanisms to clarify the relationship between long-term 
Aboriginal residents of remote communities who are not recognised as traditional owners 
and recognised traditional owners who are not residents of those communities.86 The 
informal arrangements for land use which previously prevailed in remote communities in 
the Northern Territory gave a level of de-facto land use decision-making power to 
Aboriginal residents through community government councils. In 2008 these councils were 
amalgamated into shires that operate regionally.  
 
Under the provisions of the ALRA, affected communities have an opportunity to express 
their views about proposed dealings in land, but it is ultimately traditional owners who are 
the decision makers. Accordingly, the distinction between those who fall within the 
definition of traditional owners under the ALRA and those 
who do not has begun to have more impact on community-
level decision making than was previously the case. The fact 
that traditional owners rather than residents are entitled to 
rental payments for community land use has also had an 
impact.  
 
In performing its functions under the ALRA in relation to land 
use in communities, the CLC strives to ensure an appropriate 
balance between the interests of non-resident traditional 
owners and all community residents. Such a balance is 
important to facilitate good relations and minimise the potential for disputes. To an 
extent, the CLC’s role in ensuring that this balance is appropriately negotiated without 
                                                 
86
 As noted above, n 33, Terrill has identified that despite the Australian Government arguing that ‘township leasing 
would allow non-traditional owner residents to escape the “feudal” control of traditional owners’, in practice, at least on 
the Tiwi islands, township leasing ‘has been promoted, and apparently also been received, as a vehicle for giving 
traditional owners greater input into land-use decisions’ such that it ‘has increased the authority of traditional owners.’ 
The CLC considers that the section 19A whole of township leasing model does not provide the scope to reach a 
negotiated settlement between residents and non-resident traditional owners in the way that the CLC model discussed 
in the following pages would. 
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In some communities a 
community land corporation 
model may be useful to 
clarify the relationship 
between long-term 
Aboriginal residents and 
traditional owners and to 
prevent disputes about 
community development 
and leasing issues.  
giving rise to ongoing disputes is a role that is prescribed in section 19 itself.87 This work is 
becoming increasingly complex and has led to the consideration of alternative negotiated 
arrangements for decision making on community land. In 2010 the CLC submitted an 
alternative proposal for voluntary whole of community leasing to the Australian 
Government which responds to the need for clarification of the above issues while also 
delivering other land use efficiencies.88 It should be noted that the proposal is premised on 
the strong view that the ALRA scheme works very well in recognising and giving legal effect 
to traditional Aboriginal ownership and decision making on Aboriginal land generally. It is 
directed toward the very small proportion of Aboriginal land comprising larger Aboriginal 
communities. Key features of the proposal are as follows: 
 
• Each large community establish a community land corporation for the purpose of 
holding leasehold title to the land within the community 
boundaries.89 
• The relevant Land Council would provide 
administrative and legal support in relation to a range of 
land use matters such as sub-leasing, licensing and the 
granting of permissions. 
 
The model is distinct from section 19A (whole of township) 
leasing in two key respects: 
 
a) The lease would only be for 40 years; and 
b) The corporation that held the community lease would be a decision-making body 
comprising Aboriginal residents (both traditional owner residents and other 
Aboriginal residents). 
 
The structure of community land corporations would need to be examined further on a 
case by case basis and tailored to suit a given community, but the CLC proposed that: 
 
• The members be elected by the community; 
• The membership be limited to Aboriginal residents; and 
                                                 
87
 Section 25 of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth) also confers a duty upon Land Councils to 
attempt conciliation of disputes relating to land. 
88
 CLC Paper – Community Leasing – an Alternative Proposal. It should be noted that this model was developed to 
promote discussion and the Council has endorsed it for this purpose. It is not a model on which there has been any 
specific community consultations to date, although a similar scheme is being considered in relation to Mutitjulu. 
89
 Existing leases would be recognised and incorporated within the model. 
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• The powers of the corporation should be limited to making land-related decisions 
within the community and decisions related to expending certain rent monies 
received by the Land Council. 
 
The ongoing administrative and legal support the Land Council provided the corporation 
would be entrenched in both the head lease and rules of the community land corporation. 
The model provides a delegated and expedited process for the formalisation or creation of 
individual leasehold interests by shifting decision making from an often dispersed group of 
traditional owners to Aboriginal community residents. Contrary to the section 19A model, 
it would achieve this while retaining maximum Aboriginal control over the future 
development of communities, and would ensure that both traditional owners and 
community residents benefit from land reform. The ongoing role of the relevant Land 
Council in supporting the community land corporations would provide land users with 
certainty with respect to the processing of land-use applications. 
 
The implementation of such a model would require a detailed negotiated settlement 
between traditional owners and community residents and the free prior and informed 
consent of traditional owners in accordance with the ALRA. Such a model will not be 
necessary or desirable for all communities but could provide an important opportunity to 
address the issues raised above while also providing a mechanism for responding to the 
‘stress on traditional decision making processes that community issues, such as planning, 
can cause.’90  
Conclusion 
 
Voluntary negotiated leases are now being processed and agreed to (and in some cases 
rejected) throughout the CLC region at a rapid rate. Voluntary leasing is a welcome 
development for Aboriginal land owners, particularly after the recent experience of 
compulsory acquisition of community land and the historic lack of negotiation about terms 
of occupancy. While these leases formalise land tenure arrangements resulting in greater 
clarity about ownership and responsibility for assets and infrastructure in remote 
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory, they do not necessarily lead to greater 
economic development or private home ownership.  
 
                                                 
90
 M Dillon and N Westbury, above n 67, 130–6. Many of the other concerns Dillon and Westbury raised have now been 
addressed through formalisation of tenure under section 19 of the ALRA. 
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Significant barriers to economic development and home ownership on ALRA land remain. 
A genuine effort to break down such barriers will require the Australian and Northern 
Territory governments to fund major infrastructure adequately to address infrastructure 
constraints and the lack of vacant serviced lots in remote communities. It will also require 
all parties to work together with Aboriginal land owners to develop innovative ways to 
improve access to finance, as well as considered models for home ownership and support 
for nascent Aboriginal enterprise initiatives. Such a collaborative effort will require a 
commitment to evidence not ideology, acknowledging the extent of the barriers and the 
hard work and enduring commitment that will be required to address them.  
 
